Mario Roberto Ramírez Basora is a PhD candidate in Economics at Cornell University. He holds an MA in Economics from Cornell University, as well as a Postgraduate Diploma in Business Economics and a BS in Industrial Engineering from the Pontificia Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra (PUCMM) in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. He has worked as an industrial engineer at Sara Lee and Johnson & Johnson in his native Dominican Republic. Mario's dissertation research is on the effects of asymmetric information in various settings.
Mario is on the Economics job market and will be available for interviews at the AEA/ASSA Meetings in Chicago, 2012.
Research
Fields of Concentration:
Applied Microeconomic Theory, Environmental Economics, Microeconomic Theory
"Optimal Price Instruments in Voluntary Emission Markets" (with Antonio Bento and Benjamin Ho) [Job Market Paper] (pdf):
We study the problem of an uninformed regulator who wishes to use a voluntary price instrument under varying degrees of uncertainty, specifically in the context of a carbon offset market. In this scenario, a regulator offers firms a contract that compensates private agents for producing carbon offsets while minimizing adverse selection and welfare losses. Our main findings show that the first best is achievable under perfect information or free monitoring. We find that for positive costs of monitoring, we can identify the inefficiencies generated from the additionality problem created by problems of adverse selection, but the net social benefit of an offsets program is always positive.